Wed. Jun 12th, 2024

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Researching mining centralization in Bitcoin, I came across Wownero’s solo-mining only pool resistance. There do not seem to exist any pool
mining Wownero as shown in miningpoolstats.stream.

Let us assume that Wownero’s idea of pool resistance gains so much traction that either

1. Bitcoin users upgrade it with a hard fork that requires every mining client to provide the arguments such as --receive-address {YOUR-ADDRESS} --secret-key {SECRET-SPENDKEY} in order to start mining, making Bitcoin pool-resistant
OR

2. Bitcoin users upgrade it with the same hard fork as in 1 but the users also change the mining algorithm to the ASIC-resistant RandomX.

In either of these cases some states now move to the competion stage, attempting to
obtain the majority of hashpower in order to censor.
In case 1 the states do it by operating tax-subsidized ASIC
farms. The states initially confiscate ASICS from exisiting miners,
buy ASICs on the free market, and finally subsidize also the production of
ASICS.
In case 2 some states may force their citizens to use distributions
for desktop computers such as deepin that would come with the mining software
with government receiving address and the corressponding private key hardcoded into it.
The mining process on such computers would be fine tailored to user’s activity,
e.g. a script running on in the background on a laptop would detect if the power cable is plugged in.
Mining software would only start mining when not on battery power (this
to avoid public discontent and productivity loss). Desktop PCs that are not laptops would perhaps be obliged
to run more aggressive mining operations. In the West, the governments may force corporate vendors of operating systems to include miners preinstalled, be such systems proprietary (Windows, Apple) or free as in the case of PopOS.

In either of two cases the proceeds from mining (the coinbase transaction and in the case of not
opting for mining empty blocks some whitemarket transaction fees) are meant to be used by attacking states to
subsidize further subsidize the attack. That is not always the case. In case 1 some operators of the ASIC-farms
steal the proceeds (the states may try to counteract this by granting monetary benefits for honest mining-farm operators).
In case 2 every computer savvy individual can just send this Bitcoin to themselves.

My questions:

1. How does the attack surface change for Bitcoin in case 1 and in 2?
What are other strategies of attack that I did not describe?

2. How does security of holding Bitcoin changes for non-attacking black market miners.
Everybody who has enough access to their PC to run “ps aux|grep -i bitcoind” can now get their private key.
They may ,for the sake of saving on transaction fees, use the same wallet for mining and for spending.

3. Given the high variance of reward in solo mining as the result low blockrate of Bitcoin, are
coins such as Kaspa
, that have high (1-10 per second) block emission rate, advantaged as being black market money
due to their capability of offering lower variance of reward to their miners?

4. What have I missed in my analysis?

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